By: Joseph Rinaldi

The advancement of technology has enabled the enforcement of traffic laws in ways that were not envisioned or possible when many of these laws were created. One example of this phenomenon involves the enforcement of traffic laws through the use of automated cameras placed at intersections in numerous cities across the United States. For instance, The Fourth District Court of Appeals, in Florida, has recently debated the issue of whether such automated law enforcement is legal given the Florida statutes addressing traffic laws.

 

In City of Hollywood v. Arem, No. 4D12-1312, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 16790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Oct. 15, 2014), the city of Hollywood in Florida appealed an order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss a red-light camera citation against him. In this case, the city’s red-light camera technology, operated by American Traffic Solutions (“ATS”), a private for-profit company, observed the defendant’s vehicle failing to comply with a red light signal. The high-resolution still images and high-definition video captured by ATS’ cameras showed the violating vehicle, its license plate as well as additional evidence. After the image was forwarded to the city by ATS, one of the city’s traffic infraction enforcement officers (“TIEOs”) pressed the “Accept” button, which then authorized ATS to send out a traffic infraction notification to the defendant, who did not respond. As a result, in accordance with standard protocol, ATS created a traffic citation and sent it to the defendant.

 

The court noted that the utilization of police power by a private third party violated the plain wording of Fla. Stat. § 316.0083 (1)(a) (known as the Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Program (the “Act”)), which specifically stated that only the city’s TIEOs have the power to issue traffic citations for the running of a red light. This legislation was enacted primarily to limit a municipality’s ability to legislate over traffic matters, and as a result, create a uniform traffic control system throughout the state. Thus, in Florida, TIEOs have the legal authority to issue traffic infraction citations, which also means that TIEOs are the only party that have the authority to determine who gets prosecuted for a red light violation. The contract that the city had with ATS, however, required ATS to send images and information to TIEOs only if ATS determined in its sole discretion that a violation took place.  Essentially, ATS decided which images are reviewed by the TIEOs, and ATS initially determined who was subject to prosecution for a red-light violation. The TIEO only concurred to ATS’ decision to issue the citation to the defendant. Under these circumstances, the court deemed that Fla. Stat. § 316.0083 (1)(a) had been violated because the TIEO was not issuing the citation for all intents and purposes since ATS controlled what information was, or was not, made available for a TIEO’s consideration. The court went on to say that the city improperly handed over its police power to a private third party when it contractually outsourced its statutory obligation to a for-profit, non-governmental corporation in ATS. Since this contractual outsourcing of the city’s police power to ATS violated Florida legislation, the TIEOs did not have the authority to issue the traffic citation to the defendant and the proper remedy was to dismiss the citation.

 

The Fourth District Court of Appeals in Florida utilized a literal reading of Fla. Stat. § 316.0083 (1)(a) in affirming the trial court’s holding to dismiss the defendant’s citation. Instead of attempting to decipher the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute, the court stated the plain language of the statute was clear enough to simply read the statute on its face and determine whether the action of the city was a violation of the legislation. The approach taken by the court seems rational considering the often difficult nature of determining legislative intent. The court’s approach falls in line with the main objective of the judiciary branch, which is to interpret legislation as it is written. The risk inherent in trying to determine legislative intent is that the piece of legislation could then take on a meaning that is different from how the piece of legislation reads on its face.

 

The court also emphasized that the statute intended that the police power of the city should not be handed over to a private third party. Although technology has benefitted law enforcement a great deal, the ultimate police power should remain in the hands of cities and their human agents. Without legislation such as Fla. Stat. § 316.0083 (1)(a), areas of law enforcement would become automated with no checks from human beings. For example, in this case, the defendant would have been issued a traffic infraction citation from an automated piece of technology without a human agent ever looking at the alleged infraction. The only role that a human agent would play in such a scenario would be blindly concurring with the determination made by technology. In the end, if a human being commits a violation of traffic law, he or she should be held accountable for his or her actions, but the important determination of whether a violation ever took place should be made by a human being, and not simply an automated piece of technology.

 

Bio: Joseph Rinaldi is a Staff Member of the Journal of High Technology Law. Joseph is currently a second-year day student and President of Suffolk University Law School’s Intellectual Property Law Student Association. He holds a B.A. in English/Creative Writing from the College of the Holy Cross.