By Chris Toohey
On Wednesday, February 6, 2019 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld Michelle Carter’s involuntary manslaughter conviction relating to the suicide of her then-boyfriend Conrad Roy in 2014. In its decision, written by Justice Scott L. Kafker, the Court pays particular attention to the element of causation. While recognizing the complexity of legal causation within the suicide context, the Court held that it was Carter’s “badger[ing]” of the victim, with the knowledge of his mental illness and weakened state, that proved sufficient to satisfy the causation requirement.[1] As the defense counsel themselves asserted in their appellate brief, upholding this conviction sets precedent whereby an absent defendant, with words alone, and who encourages another to commit suicide, can be convicted of a homicide. While assisted suicide statutes and common law involving other incidents of encouraging suicide have historically provided avenues for criminal prosecution in suicide cases, this SJC decision expands those opportunities to potentially dangerous new levels. Conceivably, this decision could have drastic impacts going forward on issues of bullying, end-of-life familial decisions, and beyond, where words alone may be the basis for a similar conviction.
On February 6, 2015 the Massachusetts Superior Court found and returned an indictment against Michelle Carter for the involuntary manslaughter of her then-boyfriend. The boyfriend, Conrad Roy, was found on July 13, 2014, his dead body was found in his truck as the result of an apparent suicide. The case, decided by the Honorable Judge Lawrence Moniz, resulted in a conviction and a subsequent application for direct appellate review to the Supreme Judicial Court.
While the defense argued that such a conviction “stretches the law to assign blame for a tragedy that was not a crime,”[2] the SJC supported its legal causation analysis not only with reference to the numerous states that have criminalized assisted suicide through statute,[3] but also the history of common law in Massachusetts where suicide sufficed to convict another for homicide.[4] Importantly, the Court emphasized the “vulnerable, confused, mentally ill, eighteen year old victim,”[5] as well as the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s suicidal history, and their close relationship of trust and confidence, in finding the element of causation was met and ultimately upholding the conviction.
Although the concept of suicide supporting a homicide conviction is still a relatively new and developing area of the law, this SJC decision seemingly establishes remarkable precedent related to language. The entirety of Carter’s actions on the night in question are linguistic, spoken electronically from an area far removed from the actual scene of the suicide. The Court relied on her knowledge of the victim’s suicidal tendencies and of Roy’s fears, doubts, and fragile mental state during the incident in question to conclude what she said as wanton and reckless, causing his death. It was her “badger[ing]” and “constant[] pressuring” of him that the Court noted as satisfying the legal causality requirement.[6]
Going forward this decision seemingly opens countless doors for prosecutors to bring criminal charges against third parties in instances of suicide. Specific to the elements of this case, the question remains what level of knowledge is needed and what degree of relationship is sufficient to allow words alone to qualify as wanton and reckless, as well as to satisfy the causation element. While the Court emphasized the strength of Carter and Roy’s relationship and the language Carter used in conjunction with her knowledge of the situation to affirm her conviction, both pieces beg the question where the cutoff lies to satisfy the elements of involuntary manslaughter. How intimate must the relationship be between the defendant and victim for language to qualify as wanton and reckless? What level of intent to self-harm does a victim need to exhibit to negate causation element of someone like Carter on trial for homicide ? What if Carter had no knowledge of his suicidal tendencies? Would that disqualify her conduct from being wanton or reckless?
The emphasis that this decision places on the Roy’s mental illness, and on Carter’s knowledge of his mental state and of his suicidal tendencies, has far reaching implications. Laurie Levenson, a criminal law professor at Loyola Law School, recognized these implications inherent in the field of bullying. She asserts that the Carter case raises the question as to when bullying may cross over into committing a homicide.[7] Bullying itself often inflicts psychological harm that can lead to depression and suicidal tendencies. At what point does language alone in such instances qualify as an offense warranting a homicide charge? Must the bully recognize that what they are doing could lead to suicide? Must the bully encourage the suicide, or is it merely enough that their conduct contributed to a victim’s suicide?
This ruling may also impact end-of-life discussions with elderly family members. Many family members of potentially infirm elderly people may recognize the desire of their dying elders to choose to end their life. Applying the Carter decision, discussions with their elderly family member about ending their life may open them up to criminal prosecution if they support them and verbally encourage the decision. Their family will have in depth knowledge of the person’s mental health history and will have that knowledge during a conversation regarding end of life issues. The Carter decision failed to include a distinction from the suicide/homicide scenario to allow for elder end of life decisions.
While many may feel that Carter deserved a criminal conviction for her conduct in the incident that ultimately led to the suicide of her mentally ill boyfriend, it is important to recognize the extensive implications this SJC decision will have on speech in circumstances far removed from those in the Carter case. Going forward, homicide prosecutions will likely be required in cases involving suicide in order to define the contours of this very unique ruling.
Chris Toohey is currently a 2L at Suffolk Law School with an undergraduate business background. He will be working in the field of labor and employment law as he begins his legal career.
[1] Commonwealth v. Michelle Carter, No. 12502, slip op. at 19 (Mass. Feb. 6, 2019).
[2] Laurel J. Sweet, SJC Upholds Conviction of Michelle Carter in Suicide-by-Text Case, Boston Herald (Feb. 6, 2019) https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/02/06/states-high-court-to-announce-decision-in-michelle-carter-suicide-by-text-case-today/.
[3] Carter, No. 12502, at 22, n.12.
[4] Id. at 20-22.
[5] Id. at 19.
[6] Id.
[7] Kayla Epstein, Lindsey Bever, and Kristine Phillips, Her Texts Urged a Boyfriend to Kill Himself. A Judge just Upheld her Conviction, Washington Post (Feb. 6, 2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2019/02/06/her-texts-urged-boyfriend-kill-himself-judge-just-upheld-her-conviction/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5b25384b12c3.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog are the views of the author alone and do not represent the views of JHBL or Suffolk University Law School.